Constitutional drafting processes and constitutional success

Vollständiger Abstract

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Abstract Several recent constitution-making processes have been celebrated for being participatory, inclusive, and representative. However, many of these processes also failed. We theorize that aspects of these kinds of constitutional drafting processes could reduce the probability of constitutional success. To show why, we construct a “Constitution Drafting game” (CD game) in which representatives from different interest groups must draft a constitution. We consider the case where the probability of constitutional success is single peaked, but the value from successful adoption is increasing in the degree of issue protection chosen. The drafting process then leads to protection choices that are above those which maximize the odds of constitutional success. Moreover, when the CD game is equivalent to a “nice aggregative game”, as in Acemoglu and Jensen (2013), the maximum and minimum equilibrium probabilities of constitutional success are decreasing in the number of representatives. Within a more specific game structure, we show that the symmetric equilibrium degree of protection chosen by each representative is decreasing in the number of interest groups represented, while the total degree of protection is increasing in it, leading to lower probabilities of constitutional success. We explain how optimism can exacerbate the degree of protection chosen by each party.